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Summary
Afghanistan’s stabilization appears to be gathering strength, about three years
after the U.S.-led war that brought the current government to power, but major
challenges persist.  Successful presidential elections held on October 9, 2004, and
economic reconstruction is proceeding.  However, the insurgency led by remnants of
the former Taliban regime is still active, narcotics trafficking is rampant, and local
militias, largely independent of government authority, remain throughout the country.
The report of the 9/11 Commission recommended a long-term commitment to
stabilize Afghanistan.  Legislation passed in December 2004 to implement those
recommendations (P.L. 108-458) contains several provisions on Afghanistan.
  
Since the defeat of the Taliban, Afghanistan no longer serves as a safe base of
operations for Al Qaeda.  Afghan citizens are  enjoying new personal freedoms that
were forbidden under the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and
political life, a point highlighted during First Lady Laura Bush’s visit to Afghanistan
on March 29, 2005.  Political reconstruction is slowly following the route laid out by
major Afghan factions and the international community in late 2001.  A loya jirga
(traditional Afghan assembly) adopted a new constitution on January 4, 2004.
Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held by June 2004, but security
concerns and factional infighting caused the presidential elections to be postponed
until October 9, 2004.  Parliamentary and provincial elections are now set for
September 18, 2005, with district elections put off until 2006.  The presidential
elections were held amid high turnout and minimal violence; interim president Karzai
was declared first-round winner on November 3, 2004.  A new cabinet was sworn in
December 27, 2004.  
U.S. stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government and
its security forces.  The United States and other countries are building an Afghan
National Army; deploying a multinational  International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) to patrol Kabul and other cities; running regional enclaves to secure
reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs); and disarming militia
fighters.  Approximately 18,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to combat the
Taliban-led insurgency.  To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the
United States gave Afghanistan a total of almost $1.8 billion for FY2004, mostly
through a supplemental appropriations (P.L. 108-106).  An FY2005 supplemental
appropriates about $3.35 billion, including funds for Afghan security forces, and
another $920 million is requested for the regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriations.
This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments.  See also CRS
Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections; CRS
Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report
RL32783,  FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Tsunami
Relief, and Other Activities.  
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Background to Recent Developments
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when its Communist
Party and its Islamic movement grew in strength and became increasingly bitter
opponents of each other.1  The instability shattered the relative peace and progress
that characterized the rule of Afghanistan’s last monarch, King Mohammad Zahir
Shah, who reigned from 1933 to 1973.  Prior to the founding of the monarchy in
1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was a territory inhabited by tribes and
tribal confederations often linked to neighboring nations; it was not a distinct
political entity.  King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British
forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence
from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919).  He was
considered a secular  modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic
minorities participated.  He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-
1933), and then by Zahir Shah.
Zahir Shah is remembered fondly by many Afghans for promulgating a
constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms
for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair.  However,
possibly believing that doing so would enable him to limit Soviet support for
communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant
political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.  
While undergoing medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his
cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader.  Daoud established a dictatorship
characterized by strong state control over the economy.  After taking power in 1978
by overthrowing Daoud, the communists, first under Nur Mohammad Taraki and
then under Hafizullah Amin (leader of a rival communist faction who overthrew
Taraki in 1979), attempted to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society,
in part by redistributing land and bring more women into government.  These moves
spurred recruitment for Islamic parties opposed to communist ideology.  The Soviet
Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 to prevent a seizure of
power  by the Islamic militias that  became popularly known as “mujahedin”2
(Islamic fighters).  Upon their invasion, the Soviets ousted Hafizullah Amin and
installed a local ally, Babrak Karmal, as president. 
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3  For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from
$300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second
half of the fiscal year.  Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late
1991, Congress abided by the aid figures contained in the bill. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
After the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed mujahedin fought them
effectively, and Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify  the country —
outlying  regions remained largely under mujahedin control.  The mujahedin
benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), working closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence
directorate (ISI).  That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft
systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft.  The
Islamic guerrillas also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and
manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan.  The Soviet Union’s  losses
mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war.  In 1986, after the reformist
Mikhail Gorbachev became leader — and perhaps in an effort to signal some
flexibility on a possible political settlement — the Soviets replaced Babrak Karmal
with the more pliable director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai.  
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva
Accords) requiring it  to withdraw.  That withdrawal was completed by February 15,
1989, leaving in place a weak communist government facing a determined U.S.-
backed mujahedin.  The United States closed  its embassy in Kabul in January 1989,
as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout.  A warming of superpower relations
moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the
Afghan internal conflict.  The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union reduced Moscow’s
capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World, leading Moscow to
agree with Washington on September 13, 1991, to a joint cutoff of military aid to the
Afghan combatants. 
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and
covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from
1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation  in 1989.  Press reports say  the covert aid
program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per
year during FY1986-FY1990.  The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of
Afghanistan and made the Administration and Congress less forthcoming with
subsequent funding.3 
With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, President Najibullah
publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed.  His
announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia
commanders who were nominally his allies, including by Uzbek commander Abdul
Rashid Dostam (see below).  The defectors joined prominent mujahedin commander
Ahmad Shah Masud  of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by
Burhannudin Rabbani.  Masud sent his fighters into Kabul, paving the way for the
installation of a regime led by the mujahedin on April 18, 1992.  Masud  had earned
a reputation as a brilliant strategist by successfully preventing the Soviets from
occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan.  (After
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4 For an in-depth study of the Taliban and its rule, see Rashid, Ahmad.  Taliban: Militant
Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.  Yale University Press, 2000.  
failing to flee,  Najibullah, his brother, and a few aides remained at a U.N. facility in
Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.)
Afghanistan at a Glance
Population: 28.5 million  (July 2004 est.)
Ethnic Groups: Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%;
Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%; other 4%
Religions: Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1%
GDP: $20 billion (purchasing power parity) 
External Debt: $8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral
Major Exports: fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium
Major Imports: food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles
Source:  CIA World Factbook, 2004.
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban4
The fall of  Najibullah brought the mujahedin parties to power in Afghanistan
but also exposed the serious differences among them.  The leader of one of the
smaller mujahedin parties, Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (leader of the
Afghan National Liberation Front), became president for an initial two months
(April-May 1992).  Under an agreement among the major mujahedin parties,
Burhannudin Rabbani became President in June 1992, with the understanding that
he would leave office in December 1994.  He refused to step down at that time,
maintaining that political authority would disintegrate in the absence of a clear
successor, and the other parties accused him of monopolizing power.  Kabul was
subsequently ravaged by daily shelling from another mujahedin commander,
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, attempting to force Rabbani out.  Hikmatyar, who headed a
fundamentalist faction of Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) and reportedly received a
large proportion of the U.S. covert aid during the war against the Soviet Union, was
nominally prime minister but never formally took office.  Four  years (1992-1996)
of the civil war  created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could
deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting.  (Hikmatyar was later ousted by the
Taliban from his power base around Jalalabad, despite sharing the Taliban’s ideology
and Pashtun ethnicity, and he fled to Iran before returning to Afghanistan in early
2002.  He is now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents, and his whereabouts
are unknown.)  
The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students,
many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued
conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic
seminaries (“madrassas”).  They were mostly practitioners of an orthodox form of
Sunni Islam, “Wahhabism,” similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia.  The Taliban
was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of
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Afghanistan.  Pashtuns constitute a plurality in Afghanistan, accounting for about
42% of Afghanistan’s population.  Taliban members viewed the Rabbani government
as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for continued civil war and the deterioration
of security.  With the help of defections by sympathetic mujahedin fighters, the
Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994, and
by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month
stalemate  around the capital ensued.  In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat
province, bordering Iran, and expelled its governor, Ismail Khan.  In September 1996,
a string of Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud
to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the
Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.
The Taliban was led by Mullah (Sunni Muslim cleric) Muhammad Umar, who
fought (and lost an eye) in the anti-Soviet war under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam
(Islamic Party) mujahedin party of Yunis Khalis.  Umar held the title of Head of State
and Commander of the Faithful, but he mostly remained in his power base in
Qandahar, rarely appearing in public.  He did not take an active role in governance,
but he sometimes summoned Taliban leaders to meet with him in Qandahar to
discuss pressing issues.  Considered a hardliner, Umar forged a close bond with bin
Laden and adamantly opposed meeting U.S. demands to hand him over.  Born in
Uruzgan province, Umar, who is about 60 years old, fled Qandahar when the Taliban
surrendered it on December 9, 2001.  He is still at large.  
The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support  as it  imposed
strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh
punishments, including executions.  The Taliban made extensive use of its Ministry
for the Promotion of  Virtue and the Suppression of Vice, a force of religious police
officers that often used physical punishments to enforce Islamic practices, as well as
a ban on television, Western music, and dancing.  It prohibited women from
attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it conducted
some public executions of women for various transgressions, such as adultery.  In
what many consider its most extreme  action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up
two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, which dated to the
seventh century AD.  Some experts believe the move was a reaction to U.N.
sanctions imposed in December 2000 (see below), and it provoked widespread
condemnation of the Taliban.  
Several U.N. Security Council resolutions, including 1193 (August 28, 1998)
and 1214 (December 8, 1998), urged the Taliban to end discrimination against
women.  During a November 1997 visit to Pakistan, then Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright attacked Taliban policies as “despicable.”  U.S. women’s rights
groups, including the Feminist Majority and the National Organization for Women
(NOW), mobilized to urge the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban
government.  In May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the
President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women.
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5 For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report
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See  also CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central
and South Asia and Southern Russia. 
6 On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged bin Laden-controlled
terrorist training camps in retaliation for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
Clinton Administration Relations With the Taliban
The Clinton Administration diplomatically engaged the Taliban movement as
it was gathering strength, but U.S. relations with the Taliban deteriorated sharply
during the five years that the Taliban was in power.  The two sides had become de-
facto adversaries well before the September 11, 2001 attacks.  The United States
withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan,
formally recognizing  no faction as the government.  Because of  the lack of broad
international recognition of Taliban, the United Nations seated representatives of the
Rabbani government, not the Taliban.  The State Department ordered the Afghan
embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997 because of a power struggle
that embassy.  Despite the deterioration, Clinton Administration officials met
periodically with Taliban officials to stress U.S. concerns. 
Well before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban’s hosting of  Al
Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton Administration’s overriding bilateral
agenda item with Afghanistan.5  In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand bin Laden
over to U.S. authorities, but he was rebuffed.  After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration
placed progressively more pressure on the Taliban to extradite bin Laden, adding
sanctions, some military and reported covert action,6 and the threat of further
punishments.  Clinton Administration officials say that they did not take major action
to oust the Taliban from power, either through direct U.S. military action or by
providing military aid to Taliban opponents, because domestic U.S. support for those
steps was then lacking and because the Taliban’s opponents were considered too
weak and not necessarily consistent with U.S. values.  
! On July 4, 1999, because of the Taliban’s hosting of bin Laden,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13129, imposing a ban on
U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled portions of Afghanistan and
blocking Taliban assets in U.S. financial institutions.  Afghanistan
was not named a state sponsor of terrorism on the grounds that doing
so would have implied recognition of the Taliban as the government.
! On October 15, 1999, with Russian support, the United States
achieved  adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267,
which banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana airlines, and
directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets.  
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7 Khan regained the governorship of his former stronghold in and around Herat after the
Taliban collapse.
! On  December 19, 2000, the United States and Russia achieved U.N.
Security Council adoption of  Resolution 1333, prohibiting the
provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against
Pakistan); directing a  reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation
abroad; and banning foreign travel by senior Taliban officials.  On
July 30, 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1363,
providing for the stationing of monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no
weapons or military advice was being provided to the Taliban.  (In
the aftermath of the Taliban’s ouster from power, these provisions
were narrowed to focus on Al Qaeda, and not the Taliban, by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002.)
The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban:
 Rabbani, Masud, Dostam, and Sayyaf 
The Taliban’s  policies not only alienated the Clinton Administration  but
caused other Afghan power centers to make common cause with the ousted President
Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masud,  the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition.  The
Tajiks of  the Alliance was located not only in the north but also in western
Afghanistan near the Iranian border.  Those in the west were led by Ismail Khan.7
The groups discussed below joined with these Tajik  leaders into a broader “Northern
Alliance.”
! Uzbeks/General Dostam.  One non-Tajik component of the
Alliance was the Uzbek  militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National
Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid
Dostam.  Uzbeks constitute about 9% of the population, compared
with 27% that are Tajik.  Dostam, best known for his 1992 break
with Najibullah that led to Najibullah’s overthrow that year,
subsequently fought against Rabbani during 1992-1995 in an effort
to persuade him to yield power.  Dostam joined the Northern
Alliance after the Taliban took power.  Dostam once commanded
about 25,000 troops, significant amounts of armor and combat
aircraft, and even some Scud missiles, but infighting within his
faction left him unable to hold off Taliban forces.  The Taliban
captured Dostam’s region in August 1998, leaving him in control of
only small areas near the border with Uzbekistan.  Dostam was a
candidate for president in the October 9, 2004 elections; in March
2005 Karzai appointed him  as his chief of staff for military affairs.
! Hazara Shiites.  Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims,
are prominent in central Afghanistan, particularly Bamiyan Province.
The Hazaras are  always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other
larger ethnic factions.  The main Hazara Shiite grouping is Hizb-e-
Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller groups), which
joined Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government.  Hizb-e-Wahdat has
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traditionally received some material support from Iran, whose
population practices Shiite Islam. Hizb-e-Wahdat forces
occasionally retook Bamiyan city from the Taliban, but they did not
hold it until the Taliban collapsed in November 2001.  The most
well known Hazara political leader is Karim Khalili, leader of a
large faction of Hizb-e-Wahdat; he was one of President Hamid
Karzai’s vice presidential running mates in the presidential election.
Mohaqiq, mentioned above, ran in the October 2004 presidential
election.
! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf.  Another former mujahedin party leader,
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, heads a Pashtun-dominated faction called
the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan.  Sayyaf lived
many years in and is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares
his conservative brand of Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”).  During the
U.S.-backed war against the Soviet occupation, Sayyaf’s mujahedin
faction, along with that of  Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of
U.S.-supplied weaponry.  Both criticized the U.S.-led war against
Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.  The
similarity of Sayyaf’s ideology to that of the Taliban partly explains
why many of Sayyaf’s fighters defected to the Taliban movement
during its ascendancy.  Despite that similarity, Sayyaf joined the
Northern Alliance against the Taliban.  Sayyaf  retains some militia
fighters and he is said to want to exercise major influence over the
judiciary in the post-presidential election government.  Many
Afghans believe his Islamic orthodoxy would slow modernization
of the judiciary and hinder an expansion of Western-style freedoms.
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Bush Administration policy initially differed only slightly from Clinton
Administration policy:  applying pressure short of military action against the Taliban,
while retaining some dialogue with it.  Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the
Bush Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military
assistance, although the 9/11 Commission report says that, in the months prior to the
September 11 attacks, the Administration was coming to consensus on taking such
a step.  The Commission report says some Administration officials wanted to also
assist Pashtun forces opposed to the Taliban, and not just the Northern Alliance;
other covert options might have been under consideration as well.8  Before the
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan
in an effort to persuade it to end support for the Taliban.
In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001
the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New
York.  The Taliban complied with the directive, but its representative continued to
operate informally.  In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received a Taliban
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envoy, foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah  Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues.  As
did the executive branch, Congress  became increasingly critical of the Taliban.  A
sense of the Senate resolution (S.Res. 275) that resolving the Afghan civil war should
be a top U.S. priority passed by unanimous consent on September 24, 1996.  A
similar resolution, H.Con.Res. 218, passed the House on April 28, 1998. 
Fighting with only some Iranian and Russian  support, the Northern Alliance
was unable to topple the Taliban.  After losing Kabul in 1996, the Alliance steadily
lost additional ground, even in areas populated by friendly ethnic minorities.  By the
time of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the
country and almost all major provincial capitals.  The Northern Alliance suffered a
major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks,
when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers
posing as journalists.  He was successor by his intelligence chief,  Muhammad
Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacks Masud’s charisma or authority. 
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom 
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily
overthrow the Taliban regime when it  refused a U.S. demand to immediately
extradite bin Laden.  The Bush Administration decided that a friendly regime in
Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces could eliminate
Al Qaeda activists from Afghanistan and deny it a base of operations.  In Congress,
S.J.Res.23 (P.L. 107-40) authorized “all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or
harbored such organizations or persons....”  This resolution received no opposition
(98-0 in the Senate, no objections in the House).  Another bill, H.R. 2998, P.L. 107-
148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” broadcasting service under RFE/RL,
and provided $17 million in funding for it for FY2002.  
Major Combat Phase.  The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring
Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001.  The major combat phase of  OEF
consisted  primarily of U.S. airstrikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with
targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces,
to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban
forces.  Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to
pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-
December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban
soldiers.  Most of the ground combat was between Taliban units and Afghan
opposition militias.  Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan
militia forces in OEF strengthened the militias’ subsequent autonomy. 
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif  to Dostam on
November 9, 2001.  Northern Alliance forces commanded by Mohammad Fahim —
who had initially promised U.S. officials his forces would not enter the city itself but
then abrogated that pledge — captured Kabul three days later.  The collapse in the
north was followed by its loss of control of southern and eastern Afghanistan to pro-
U.S. Pashtun commanders, such as Hamid Karzai.  Karzai had entered Afghanistan
just after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban,
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supported in that effort by U.S. special forces.  He became central to U.S. efforts in
the south  after another Pashtun leader, Abdul Haq, entered Afghanistan in October
2001 without coordination with or support from U.S. forces; he was captured and
killed by the Taliban.  As the Taliban collapsed, groups of other Pashtun commanders
took control of cities and provinces in the east and south.  
Major U.S. combat operations continued after the fall of the Taliban.  The
United States and its Afghan allies conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-
Kot Valley south of Gardez during March 2 - 19, 2002, to eliminate a pocket of as
many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters.  In late March 2003, about 1,000 U.S.
troops launched a raid on suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around
Qandahar.  On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Afghan president
Karzai declared major OEF combat operations ended.  Smaller operations against
Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants continue, as discussed below. 
Post-War Stabilization Efforts9
The war paved the way for the success of an eight year long U.N. effort to form
a broad-based Afghan government.  The United Nations was viewed as a credible
mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation, but
some observers criticized U.S. policy as being insufficiently engaged to bring about
a settlement.  Proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of
former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional
assembly, the loya jirga.  U.N. mediation, at times, appeared to make progress, but
ceasefires between warring factions always broke down.  One U.N. mediator,
Algerian diplomat  Lakhdar Brahimi ended his efforts in frustration in October 1999.
In coordination with direct U.N. mediation efforts, a “Six Plus Two” contact
group began meeting in early 1997; the group consisted of the United States, Russia,
and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.  The group was created following informal meetings of
some of the key outside parties, in which these countries, including the United States,
agreed not to arm the warring factions.10  In 2000, a “Geneva group” on Afghanistan
began meeting:  Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States.  Another mediation
effort existed within the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).  
The United States also supported initiatives coming from individual Afghans,
including Karzai’s clan.  One initiative, the Intra Afghan Dialogue, consisted of
former mujahedin commanders and clan leaders; it held meetings during 1997 and
1998 in Bonn, Frankfurt, Istanbul, and Ankara.  Another group was centered around
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former King Zahir Shah  (“Rome Grouping”), and a third grouping, the “Cyprus
Process,” consisted of other Afghan exiles.
The Bonn Conference.  Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Brahimi
was brought back as U.N. mediator.  On November 14, 2001, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1378, calling for a “central” U.N. role in establishing a
transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces
to promote stability and secure the delivery of aid.  In late November 2001, after
Kabul had fallen, the United Nations invited delegates of the major Afghan factions,
most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King, to a conference
Bonn, Germany.  The Taliban was not invited.  On December 5, 2001, the factions
signed the “Bonn Agreement,” which 
! formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the
holding in June 2002 of a loya jirga, which would be opened by the
former King and would choose a government to run Afghanistan
until a new constitution is approved and national elections held
(planned for June 2004).  Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the
interim administration, weighted heavily (17 out of 30 of the
positions) toward the Northern Alliance.  This bloc held the key
posts of Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah Abdullah),
and Interior (Yunus Qanooni).  The three are ethnic Tajiks, with the
exception of Dr. Abdullah (half Tajik and half Pashtun); all are in
their late 40s, and were close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud.  It was
agreed that, in the interim, Afghanistan would abide by the
constitution of 1964.11 
 ! An international peace keeping force would be formed to maintain
security, at least in Kabul, and Northern Alliance forces were to
withdraw from Kabul.  
 ! The Bonn Agreement was endorsed by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001), and the international
peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution
1386 (December 20, 2001).12 
Hamid Karzai and His Governing Style.  President Karzai, who is about
50 years old, is leader of the powerful Popolzai  tribe of  Durrani Pashtuns; he
became tribal leader when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents,
in Quetta, Pakistan in 1999.  Karzai, who had attended university in India, had been
deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995.  In 1995, he
supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani, but he broke with the
Taliban as its excesses unfolded.  During 1997-2001, some of his several brothers
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lived in the United States.  As noted above, prior to the September 11 attacks, he and
his clan had reached out to the Northern Alliance  in a broad anti-Taliban alliance,
while also seeking dialogue to persuade the Taliban to share power.  He is viewed as
a leader who seeks factional compromise rather than by intimidating his opponents
with the use of armed force. 
Permanent Constitution.  In preparation for the 2002 “emergency” loya
jirga, the former King  returned to Afghanistan on April 18, 2002.  By the time of the
meeting,  381 districts of Afghanistan had  chosen the 1,550 delegates to it, of which
about 200  were women.  At the loya jirga, which began June 11, 2002,  the former
King and Rabbani, withdrew from leadership candidacy and the assembly selected
Karzai to continue to  lead until planned June 2004 national elections.  On its last day
(June 19, 2002), the assembly approved a new cabinet, which included three vice
presidents and was very similar to the previous cabinet.  The loya jirga did not
establish a parliament. 
After the loya jirga, the process of drafting a permanent constitution began.  A
35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October 2002, drafted the
document,  and it was publicly unveiled in November 2003.  It was debated by 502
delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during
December 13, 2003 - January 4, 2004.  The CLJ, chaired by Sibghatullah  Mojadeddi
(who is discussed above),  ended with approval of the constitution with only minor
changes from the draft.  
Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies
did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the presidency in the drafting
process or at the CLJ.  The Alliance had wanted to set up a prime minister-ship as a
check on presidential power, but that was not included in the draft out of broad
concerns that a prime minister might emerge as a rival to the presidency.13  As an
alternative, the Northern Alliance sought a strong elected parliament.14 At the CLJ,
some additional powers were given to the parliament, such as veto power over senior
official nominees.  Some experts believe that setting up a strong presidency places
undue weight on Karzai’s incumbency and self-restraint.  According to the new
constitution:
! Two vice presidents run on the same election ticket as the president,
and one succeeds him in the event of the president’s death.  They
serve a five-year term, and presidents are limited to two terms.  If
no presidential candidate receives at least 50%, a run-off is to be
held within two weeks.  The constitution gives parliament the ability
to impeach a president.  
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! There is to be a two-chamber parliament, provincial, and district
councils.  The lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of People), to
consist of 249 seats, is to be fully elected at the same time, if
possible, as presidential elections.  
! The 102 seat upper chamber (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders) is
to be selected as follows: one-third of the seats (34) are appointed by
the President; another one third (34, one per province) are selected
by provincial councils (elected, if possible, the same day as the
parliamentary elections); and a final 34 are selected by the nearly
400 district  councils (elected, if possible, the same day as the
parliamentary elections).  The constitution does not stipulate other
roles for the district councils, although some believe they will
ultimately acquire some power to impose local taxes and provide
local services.15  
! In the elected lower house, at least 68 of those elected (an average
of two per province x 34 provinces) “should” be women.  That
would give women about 25% of the seats in that body.  The goal is
to be met through election rules that would give seats to the top
women vote-getters in each province.  In the upper house, 50% of
the president’s appointments are to be women, giving women at
least 17 seats (half of the president’s 34 nominees) — about 17% of
that body.  
! The constitution  allows political parties to be established so long as
their charters “do not contradict the principles of Islam,” and they do
not have affiliations with other countries.  The constitution does not
impose Sharia (Islamic law), but it does attempt to satisfy
Afghanistan’s conservative clerics by stipulating that laws shall  not
contradict “the beliefs and provisions” of  Islam. 
! Protects minorities by giving Uzbeks and Turkmens rights for their
language to be official languages in their regions, provisions not
contained in the original draft.  This represented an apparent victory
for Afghanistan’s minorities; the Pashtun leaders had wanted the
final constitution to designate Pashto as the sole official language.
National Elections.  A separate CRS report, CRS Report RS21922,
Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, provides information on the
presidential election, including results and funding, as well as the upcoming
parliamentary and provincial elections.  As noted in that report, the October 9, 2004,
presidential voting was orderly and turnout heavy (about 8.2 million votes cast out
of 10.5 million registered voters).  On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared
winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round,
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avoiding a runoff.  He was inaugurated on December 7, 2004, with Vice President
Cheney attending.  
Parliamentary elections had been intended for April-May  2005, although they
have now been scheduled for September 18, 2005.  The provincial councils are to be
elected that same day.  However, because of the difficulty in confirming voter
registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the district
councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, have been put
off until some time in 2006.  Voting district boundaries have been determined, and
the number of lower house parliamentary seats for each province has been set.  There
will be a “supplemental voter registration” period during June 25-July 21 to correct
voter registration errors or oversights from the October 2004 presidential election.
Because the district elections will not be held at the same time as the
parliamentary and provincial elections, the Afghan election commission has said
that, as an interim measure, the upper house of parliament is to consist of the 34
selectees of the provincial councils, and 17 presidential appointees.  The remaining
51 seats of the upper house are to be filled  when district elections are held in 2006.
According to the U.N. Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), as of
June 8, 2005, there are 2,885 candidates for the lower house of parliament thus far
(including 338 women) and 3,186 candidates for the provincial councils (including
270 women).  As of October 2004, the latest date for which official information is
available, 70 political parties were registered with the Justice Ministry.  Karzai has
not formed his own party, and some of his allies in government say he is unlikely to
do so.  Yunus Qanooni, Karzai’s main presidential election challenger, was not given
a cabinet seat in the new government, prompting him to announce the formation of
a “New Afghanistan” opposition party, and a broader, multi-party opposition
coalition called the “Afghanistan National Coordination Front.”  These groupings
will not only compete in the parliamentary elections but will monitor government
performance until then.  On May 18, 2005, former Taliban foreign minister Wakil
Mutawakkil, who was released from prison as part of a reconciliation deal, said he
plans to run for parliament.  
U.S. Election Assistance.  The FY2005 supplemental appropriations (P.L.
109-13) provides $1.086 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF), but the
conference report does not specify how much of the funds is to be used for election
assistance.  The Administration request had asked, within a broad $265 million
“democracy and governance” category, for $60 million in funds for parliamentary
elections and voter education functions.
Post-Presidential Election Cabinet.16  On December 27, 2004, a new 27-
seat cabinet was sworn in.  Broadly, the cabinet appears to retain the factional
balance (among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others)  that previously
existed, but the main security ministries, Defense and Interior, are now occupied by
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Pashtun ministers.  There are eight Tajik ministers.  However, the cabinet generally
emphasizes technocratic qualifications (nine have Ph.D’s) over factional allegiances:
! The most prominent Northern Alliance minister, Fahim, was
replaced as Defense Minister by his Pashtun deputy, Abdul Rahim
Wardak.  Wardak  lived in the United States during Taliban rule.
Fahim’s ouster has heightened tensions between Karzai and the
Northern Alliance grouping. 
! Prominent Northern Alliance figure, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, was
retained as Foreign Minister, and Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a
Pashtun, was retained.  Jalali reportedly must relinquish his U.S.
citizenship to retain the post. 
! Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani (a Pashtun), well liked by
international donors, was dropped in favor of another Pashtun,
Karzai ally (and Central Bank governor) Anwar ul-Haq Ahady.  
! Three women are in the cabinet, an addition of one from the
previous cabinet.  Female presidential candidate Masooda Jalal was
made Minister of Women’s Affairs; Sediqa Balkhi is Minister for
Martyrs and the Disabled; and Amina Afzali is Minister of Youth.
! To emphasize his stated commitment to end the burgeoning
narcotics trafficking problem, Karzai created a new Ministry of
Counter-Narcotics, headed by Habibullah Qadari.  
Part of the U.S. and Afghan stabilization strategy is to build democratic
traditions at the local level.  The Afghan government’s “National Solidarity Program”
seeks to create local governing councils and empower these councils to make
decisions about local reconstruction priorities.  Elections to these local councils have
been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected to them have been
women.17  The FY2005 supplemental request included, within the $265 million broad
democracy category, $155 million in ESF for programs including the National
Solidarity Program.  The conference report on P.L. 109-13 does not specify how
much of the $1.086 billion in ESF appropriated is allocated for these programs. 
Key Challenges to the Transition
Karzai’s government is slowly expanding its writ, although tensions remain
among factions of the national government and between the central government and
some regional leaders.  Aside from the security concerns generated by continuing
Taliban insurgency, the political transition is  proceeding steadily but continues to
face challenges that are discussed below. 
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Constraining Regional Leaders.  The Kabul government is slowly
expanding its authority and its capabilities and curbing regional leaders who
sometimes act outside government control.  This effort is supplemented by U.N.
programs to disarm identified and illegal militias, as discussed below (DDR
programs).  In an indication of the scope of the problem, on July 11, 2004, Karzai
cited regional and factional militias as the key threat to Afghan stability — greater
than that posed by continuing Taliban attacks.  In his first post-election speech on
November 4, 2004, Karzai said he would continue curbing militias.  On the other
hand, some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy
and that the effort to increase the authority of the central government will likely incur
consistent opposition.  Some critics attribute the continued strength of regional
militias to U.S. policies to use these militias to combat Taliban and Al Qaeda
remnants.  Others believe that easily obtained arms and manpower, funded by
narcotics trafficking profits, help to sustain the independence of local factions and
militias.  Still others maintain that local militias did not interfere to any great extent
on the presidential vote and that the issue is fading as an obstacle to Afghan stability.
Karzai’s 2004 cabinet selections showed his attempts to marginalize regional
strongmen.  He removed Pashtun regional leader Ghul Agha Sherzai as Minister of
Public Works and of Urban Development but then returned him to his prior post as
governor of Qandahar.  Herat strongman Ismail Khan was appointed Minister of
Water and Energy; he had been removed by Karzai as governor of Herat Province in
September 2004.  As noted above, Dostam has been appointed Karzai’s top military
advisor, taking him away from his political base in northern Afghanistan.  He took
up his post in April 2005 after “resigning” as head of his Junbush Melli faction.  In
July 2004, Karzai removed a charismatic Northern Alliance commander, Atta
Mohammad, from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area and moved two
other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad (Qandahar
area) into civilian police chief posts.  
One commander of concern is former Defense Minister Fahim, still the Northern
Alliance’s military chief, who now has no official position.  Although he has mostly
withdrawn Northern Alliance militia fighters from Kabul, as required in the Bonn
agreement, and turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan
forces (see below), he could conceivably still pose a military threat to Karzai’s
government, should he turn to armed rebellion.  Another potential threat is Abd-Rab
Rasul Sayyaf, discussed above.  Sayyaf has refused to allow his “Division 1” militia
in Kabul to be dismantled.  
Strengthening Central Government.  Afghanistan’s central government
still lacks administrative capacity.  As part of the U.S. push to build government
capacity in advance of the 2004 Afghan elections, the Administration assigned 14
U.S. officials (fewer than the 20 that were planned) full- or part-time to the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul (Afghan Reconstruction Group, ARG) to serve as additional
advisors to the Afghan government.  Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan
origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, became ambassador in
December 2003, and he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan government
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decisions.18  However, he has now left Afghanistan and been nominated to become
ambassador to Iraq.  Ambassador Ronald Neumann has been nominated as his
replacement.  To assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and coordinate reconstruction and
diplomacy, in 2004 the State Department created an Office of Afghanistan Affairs,
now headed by Ambassador Maureen Quinn.  In addition, U.S. intelligence is
advising the National Security Directorate to help it build its capabilities to monitor
threats to the new government.19  
As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for Karzai, the Administration
has maintained a pattern of senior visits.  As noted above. Vice President Cheney
attended Karzai’s inauguration in December  2004.  In March 2005, Secretary of
State Rice, and then First Lady Laura Bush (March 29, 2005) visited Afghanistan.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has visited roughly every three months.  
Funding Issues/FY2005 Supplemental.  The U.S. embassy is expanding
its personnel and facilities to help accelerate the reconstruction process, and it is
improving its physical security capabilities.  The  FY2005 supplemental
appropriation request asked $240 million to help build the capacity of the Afghan
central government, including salaries, and to promote democracy and rule of law.
The conference report on P.L. 109-13 provided the requested $60 million for
embassy Kabul operations, as well as the requested $17.1 million in non-
proliferation, anti-terrorism, and de-mining (NADR) funds for Karzai protection.
Additional amounts for Afghan government capacity are not specified.  Part of the
U.S. embassy funds are for contract security to replace U.S. marines that now guard
the compound.  A requested $25 million to improve the Kabul international airport
was not  provided.20
Combating Narcotics Trafficking.  A detailed discussion of the narcotics
trafficking issue, including U.S. funding to combat this problem in Afghanistan, is
provided in CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy.
Narcotics trafficking has been identified as a growing problem facing the Karzai
government, and the State Department’s International Narcotics Strategy Report,
released March 4, 2005, says that Afghanistan is “on the verge of becoming a
narcotics state.”  In his November 4, 2004 election victory speech, and at a Kabul
conference on the issue two days after his December 7, 2004 inauguration, he called
on Afghans to join a “jihad” against the opium trade.  On December 12, 2004, he
pledged to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy fields within two years.  A U.N. preliminary
report released March 27, 2005 said there has been some response to Karzai’s
initiatives, and that poppy crop planting for next year’s crop is falling from the prior
year’s level in 29 out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.  On the other hand, a press
report published on the eve of Karzai’s May 23, 2005, visit to the United States said
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that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul had assessed that Karzai was refusing or failing to
overcome Afghan resistance to more assertive U.S. and Afghan efforts to reduce
poppy cultivation.21  In April 2005, for example, Afghan farmers in the Qandahar
area fought Afghan units who were attempting to eradicate poppy fields.  During the
course of the Karzai visit, however, U.S. officials praised Karzai’s cooperation on
narcotics issues. 
U.S. official reports say  that about $2.3 billion — half of Afghanistan’s GDP
  — is generated by narcotics trafficking.  According to the 2004 Opium Survey
conducted by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan
Counternarcotics Directorate, published November 2004, the opium crop was close
to 4,200 metric tons for 2004, a 17% increase from 2003 and keeping Afghanistan
as the leading producer of opium crop.22  Cultivation took place on 131,000 hectares
of land for 2004, an increase of 64% from the 80,000 hectares of land used for opium
production in 2003, according to that report, although some estimates say that as
much as 206,000 hectares were under poppy cultivation. Several reports and
observers say that narcotics trafficking is funding Taliban insurgents and their allies
in Afghanistan, and there are widespread fears that local leaders might use narcotics
profits to fund their campaigns for  parliament.  On the other hand, the traffickers do
not appear to have formed cartels, and it is not clear that those involved in the
narcotics trade necessarily have independent political objectives.  
Britain has been formally the lead coalition partner in reducing narcotics
production and trafficking; it has been raiding some drug processing labs and has sent
counter-narcotics forces to the Qandahar province.  In May 2004, the United States
began funding a separate program to work with Afghan government officials to
destroy poppy fields themselves, but the Afghan government apparently has
persuaded the United States not to focus primarily on creating alternative livelihoods
that will dissuade Afghans from engaging in cultivation. 
Some Bush Administration officials have sought to task the U.S. military to play
a greater role in attacking traffickers and their installations, a mission the U.S.
military reportedly had been reluctant to perform on the grounds that it would expand
the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan.23  On April 6, 2005, Lt. Gen. Barno,
formerly the senior U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said the U.S. military would
expand its counter-narcotics role by flying Afghan forces on missions, identifying
targets, and taking charge of training counter-narcotics police.  In November, 2004,
press reports said the Bush Administration would also take new legal steps against
suspected Afghan drug traffickers by indicting them and putting the legal machinery
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in place to have them extradited from Afghanistan if caught.24  In mid-April 2005,
a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker,
Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York. 
On November 17, 2004, the Bush Administration (Assistant Secretary of State
for INL, Robert Charles) announced “Plan Afghanistan,” a $780 million (FY2005
funds) program to raise public awareness about the problem, promote alternative
livelihoods, and conduct interdiction and crop eradication.  The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) is  a participant in Plan Afghanistan.  There might be some
controversy over a U.S. plan to buy 14 used Israeli helicopters for use by the Afghans
in drug eradication; Afghanistan’s conservative Muslims will likely oppose the use
of formerly Israeli equipment.25 
Funding Issues/FY2005 Supplemental.  Substantial U.S. counter-
narcotics funds are being provided. 
! For FY2004, the United States provided  $220 million to assist
Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics effort and to train Afghan police,
both handled by INL.  Of that, $170 million was appropriated in the
FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106), and $50 million
is being provided from the post-September 11 “Emergency
Response Fund.”  The supplemental also provided $73 million for
Defense Department counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan,
virtually all of which has been spent. 
! The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447)
contained no hard earmark for Afghan counter-narcotics.  
! The FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided
substantial funds for “Plan Afghanistan”: $227 million for DOD
counter-narcotics in Afghanistan ($30 million less than requested);
the requested $260 million for INL counter-narcotics; the requested
$8 million for DEA operations in Afghanistan; and $34 for counter-
narcotics operations of the Afghan government.  The requested $248
million to promote alternative livelihoods was not specifically
provided, nor was $46 million for aerial eradication. The
appropriation also  provides for furnishing Afghan counter-narcotics
forces with some weaponry and equipment, as well as for an audit
of how U.S. counter-narcotics funds are used there.
! The request for regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriations asks $260
million for counter-narcotics and police training purposes.  
The Bush Administration has not imposed sanctions on post-Taliban
Afghanistan even though it has determined that Afghanistan is a major drug transit
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or illicit drug producing country. To avoid sanctioning Afghanistan, the
Administration has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of countries that have
“failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” during the past 12 months to adhere
to international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics
measures set forth in U.S. law.26  Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one
issue on which the Taliban  satisfied much of the international community; the
Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation, which the U.N. International
Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said in February 2001 had dramatically decreased
cultivation in the areas surveyed.27  The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban
in areas it controlled. 
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy.  U.S. and Afghan
officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy
ravaged by war and lack of investment.  Since 2003, an accelerated U.S. economic
reconstruction plan has showcased some evidence of success, including roads,
education, and health.28 
! Roads.  Paving of the Kabul-Qandahar roadway project (Phase I),
completed in December 2003.  According to USAID, Phase II
paving was completed in November 2004, and several bridges have
been completed.  Work has begun on the Qandahar-Herat roadway,
which will be funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.
U.S.-funded ($2.7 million) work began on March 15, 2005 for a road
out of the Panjshir Valley.  
! Education and Health.  Additional work is being  conducted on
school and health clinic rebuilding (180 schools and clinics were
built during 2004), and agriculture projects, such as the setting up of
138 market centers country-wide.  During her March 29, 2005 visit
to Afghanistan, First Lady Laura Bush announced U.S. grants out of
FY2005 funds of $17.7 million for a private “American University
of Kabul,” and $3.5 million for primary school education.  These
grants were part of the approximately $152 million in U.S. funds
programmed for Afghanistan education during FY2003-FY2005 (of
which $85 million was appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental,
P.L. 108-106).  On the other hand, some outside experts said in June
CRS-20
29 Shea, Nina.  “Sharia in Kabul?”  National Review, October 28, 2002.  
2005 that overall health conditions might be worsening and that
Afghanistan might soon face a cholera epidemic. 
Funding/FY2005 Supplemental.  The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
appropriates $1.086 billion in ESF out of the $2 billion requested for all civilian
reconstruction projects.  The conference report says the amount “assumes full
funding” for health programs and provincial reconstruction team (PRTs, discussed
below) expenses.  Among projects apparently not funded are refurbishment of Kabul
Airport, venture capital funding, industrial park funding, higher education including
costs of a new law school in Kabul, and various long term construction projects
(hydropower and a gas fired power plant, industrial parks, and courthouses).  The
FY2006 regular foreign aid requests asks for about $620 million for economic
reconstruction-related activities. 
Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices.
Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban.
The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to
meet and organize freely,  according to the State Department report on human rights
practices for 2004 (released February 28, 2005).  However, according to the State
Department and other reports, including an April 2005 report submitted by U.N.
human rights monitor on Afghanistan Cherif  Bassiouni, there continue to be reports
of  reprisals and other abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism in many
parts of Afghanistan.  Some believe the Afghan police mishandled protests in
Jalalabad, Ghazni, and other cities during May 11-13, 2005, which erupted in
response to a May 9 Newsweek story that U.S. interrogators in Guantanamo Bay had
mishandled and dishonored the Quran.  The unrest resulted in 15 Afghans killed,
which some attributed to overreaction and  excessive use of force by the police.  The
Afghan government says the protests were stoked by  Taliban remnants and pro-
Hikmatyar activists.  The State Department report also cites the arbitrary
implementation of justice and corruption in areas controlled by regional leaders as
a key source of Afghan human rights abuses.  On the other hand, some ethnic
minorities look to the regional leaders to defend their interests. 
Some observers say that the government  is reimposing some Islamic restrictions
that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated
in Islamic law.29  Some have blamed the increased restrictions on chief justice Fazl
Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative who was appointed in late November 2001
by Rabbani, just after the Taliban fled Kabul but before Karzai took office.  In
January 2003, Shinwari called for cable television in Kabul to be shut down on the
grounds it was un-Islamic, and he called for an end to co-education, although his
directives apparently have not been implemented by the government.  Although U.S.
officials are privately critical of Shinwari, the U.S. government has generally
refrained from advising the new government on these issues, lest the United States
be accused of undue interference in Kabul’s affairs.  U.S. programs — many of
which are conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country
on judicial reform — generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system,
including police training and court construction.  The United States has provided
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numerous training programs for judges, prosecutors, and court administrators for the
Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court.  The
conference report on the FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) does not specifically
appropriate the requested $25 million for court administration, a law school, and
other rule of law programs. 
An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) also has been
formed to monitor government performance; it is headed by former Women’s Affairs
minister Sima Samar.  The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106),
appropriated $5 million to fund the Commission in FY2004.  This is the amount
authorized, for each FY2003-2006, for that purpose, in the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327).  Another $2 million for the AIHC was
appropriated in P.L. 108-447, the regular FY2005 appropriation.  
Advancement of Women.30  The government is widely considered to be
promoting the advancement of women, although the treatment of women remains
subject to Afghanistan’s conservative traditions.  The first major  development in
post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
now headed by former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal, which is dedicated to
improving women’s rights.  That ministry has tried to get more Afghan women
involved in business ventures and it has invited Afghan religious scholars to hear
interpretations of the Quran that favor participation of women in national affairs.  In
another notable development, in March 2005 Karzai appointed former Minister of
Women’s Affairs Habiba Sohrabi as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly
by Hazaras.  As noted above, the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the
seats in the upper house of parliament and 17% of the upper house, three women are
in the new cabinet, and the constitution recognizes men and women as equal citizens.
Women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were rarely held
by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, 31 including in the new
police force.  Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly starting small
businesses and learning how to drive.  Under the new government, the wearing of the
full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, although many women
continue to wear it by tradition. 
Although the treatment of Afghan women has improved since the Taliban were
removed from power, the Administration and Congress have taken a continued
interest in the treatment of women in Afghanistan.  After the Karzai government took
office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan
Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s
visit to Afghanistan in March 2005.  The United States was active at the
constitutional loya jirga to enshrine in the new constitution protections for women
and policies to advance women in government.
CRS-22
32 For more information on how the appropriated funds were distributed and used, see CRS
Report RL31173, Combating Terrorism: First Emergency Supplemental Appropriations-
Distribution of Funds to Departments and Agencies.  
Funding to Advance Afghan Women.  In recent congressional action:  
! On November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House
unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children
Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate.  The law (signed
December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of
supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the
Office of the President $40 billion to respond to the September 11,
2001 attacks, and which was subsequently distributed throughout the
government to fund various programs)32 to fund educational and
health programs for Afghan women and children.  
! The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327)
authorized $15 million per year, for FY2003-2006, for the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs.
!  The FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) appropriated $60 million
for programs to assist Afghan women and girls, and expresses the
sense of Congress that the United States seek (in Afghanistan and
Iraq) to promote high level participation of women in legislative
bodies and ministries and ensure their rights in new institutions.  The
section also calls on the Administration to seek to ensure women’s
access to credit, property, and other economic opportunities.  In
concert with a meeting with President Karzai, on June 15, 2004,
President Bush announced that the United States would fund a $4
million women’s  teacher training institute in Kabul and that it
would provide $5 million for small business grants to Afghan
women.  
! The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation, P.L. 108-447,
provides $50 million for Afghan women and girls, of which $7.5
million is to go to small grants to women’s businesses.  Another $6
million is appropriated in that law for maternal and child health care
in Afghanistan.  On March 11, 2005, the Administration announced
a $2.275 million grant (FY2005 funds) to the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, during a visit to the United States by Minister Masooda
Jalal.  
! The conference report on P.L. 109-13, the FY2005 supplemental,
recommends $5 million be used for women’s organizations’ capacity
building.  The FY2005 supplemental request said that some of a $60
million request for “elections and democracy” programs (part of the
broader $265 million democracy and governance request would be
used for “Muslim outreach with an emphasis on women’s  issues.”
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Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building
Much of the U.S. program for Afghanistan is focused on securing Afghanistan.
The report of  the 9/11 Commission  recommends that “...the United States and the
international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable
Afghanistan ... so that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for
international crime and terrorism.”  Despite the Taliban’s overthrow, Taliban, pro-
Hikmatyar, and some Al Qaeda  militants continue to operate in Afghanistan.  The
pillars of the security effort are (1) combat operations by U.S. and other coalition
forces in Afghanistan; (2) patrols by a NATO-led  International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF); (3) the formation of “provincial reconstruction teams”  (PRTs);  (4)
the establishment and training of an Afghan National Army and a police force; and
(5) the demobilization  of  local militias.  These programs are discussed below. 
Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 18,000
troops in Afghanistan, and six coalition countries are contributing another 1,600
combat troops to OEF.  Their primary mission is to combat Taliban remnants other
insurgents, but several hundred additional OEF forces also contributed to security for
the October presidential elections.  The current commander of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan is Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry  (as of May 3, 2005, replacing Lt. Gen David
Barno).  Eikenberry heads the “Combined Forces Command (CFC),” headquartered
near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, relocating in late 2003 from Bagram air base north
of Kabul.  OEF forces do not routinely conduct “peacekeeping” missions or patrol
Afghan neighborhoods.  Japan’s navy provides fuel for coalition warships involved
in OEF, and Japan has extended that mission through November 1, 2005.
(Additional foreign troops are part of ISAF, see below).  
U.S. forces along with Afghan troops continue on the offensive against
insurgents.  Earlier, the United States and Afghanistan launched  “Operation
Mountain Viper” on August 25, 2003, followed up by “Operation Avalanche,”
(December 8-30, 2003).  During March to July 2004, U.S. forces, along with Afghan
National Army soldiers, conducted “Operation Mountain Storm” against Taliban
remnants in and around Uruzgan province (home province of Mullah Umar).  Other
significant operations against militants, particularly in southeastern Afghanistan, took
place in May-October 2004 as part of a “spring offensive.”  A winter offensive,
“Operation Lightning Freedom,” was conducted in December 2004-February 2005.
Some reports suggest that the combat, coupled with overall political and
economic reconstruction, appears to be succeeding against the insurgency, although
insurgents attacks have escalated somewhat since April 2005.  Their attacks focus on
aid workers, U.S. and Afghan soldiers, and police.  Although some U.S. commanders
 — including Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers on a visit to Afghanistan
in early March 2005 — are saying the insurgency is weakening, they caution that an
early reduction in U.S. or other foreign troops in Afghanistan could allow insurgents
to regroup.  U.S. commanders also attribute the progress to a new military strategy,
launched by Lt. Gen. Barno in February 2004, to station some U.S. forces in
populated areas to cultivate relations with them and thereby better acquire combat-
relevant information.  According to an outgoing top U.S. commander in Afghanistan
(Maj. Gen.  Eric Olson) on March 7, 2005, Mullah Umar essentially has lost control
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of the insurgency, although he reportedly continues to travel around eastern and
southern Afghanistan, meeting with Taliban insurgent commanders and exhorting
them to continue their insurgency.  Some of his top aides have been captured, but
others, such as Jalaludin Haqqani and Mullah Akhtar Usmani, are still at large.  In
addition, in April 2005 Taliban remnants started a clandestine radio station, “Voice
of Shariat,” suggesting the movement still has substantial resources.  
The success of the October 9 presidential elections apparently caused a rift in
the Taliban, with some militants now negotiating with the government to join the
political process or surrendering.  President Karzai has offered “moderate” Taliban
amnesty in exchange for allowing them into the political process.  According to press
reports, about 50-60 militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists,
have joined the reconciliation process, which is headed by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi.
In January 2005, U.S. forces in Afghanistan released 81 detained Taliban fighters at
Karzai’s request.  Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would
not be eligible for amnesty or political engagement.  Mojadeddi said in May 2005
that even Mullah Umar or Hikmatyar might be eligible for amnesty, but U.S. officials
quickly distanced themselves from Mojadeddi’s comments.  
Ending Taliban urban terrorist attacks is considered a more complicated
mission.  Such attacks have included a September 5, 2002, car bombing in a crowded
marketplace in Kabul and a virtually simultaneous unsuccessful assassination attempt
against President Karzai.  One of the most significant attacks occurred on June 1,
2005, when a mosque in Qandahar was bombed, killing 40 Afghans, including
Kabul’s police chief.  Four Americans were killed in an August 29, 2004, bombing
of  a U.S. security contractor (Dyncorps) facility in Kabul.  (In January 2005, Afghan
authorities arrested an Afghan judge for allegedly harboring Al Qaeda or Taliban
militants who conducted that attack.)  A British citizen working in Afghanistan was
shot by unknown assailants in Kabul in March 2005, and an Italian worker for CARE
was kidnapped in mid-May 2005 but released in June 2005.  A bomb blast  killed
three at a cyber-cafe in Kabul on May 8, 2005
The Hunt for Al Qaeda and Other Militants.  U.S. Special Operations
Forces continue to hunt for bin Laden and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Bin
Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold
of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001.  However, bin Laden is
widely believed to be on the Pakistan side of the border. 
As noted above, another target of OEF is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami
Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents.  On February 19,
2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially
Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224.  That
order subjected named terrorists and terrorist-related institutions to financial and
other U.S. sanctions.  The HIG is included in the section on “other terrorist groups”
in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2003, released April
2004.  The group is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.”
Longer Term Presence.  Even if the Taliban insurgency is defeated
completely, it appears that the United States will maintain a long-term presence in
Afghanistan.  Top U.S. commanders, including Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard
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Myers (on a visit to Afghanistan in March 2005), say that the United States might
seek permanent bases in Afghanistan, but that no decision or recommendation on that
had been made.  President Karzai told visiting Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on April
13, 2005, that Afghanistan would ask President Bush for  a long-term security pact
with the United States that might include permanent bases, although Rumsfeld
reportedly was non-committal.  On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000
delegates to a national consultation in Kabul on the proposal to allow permanent U.S.
bases in Afghanistan; delegates reportedly supported an indefinite presence of
international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision on
allowing permanent U.S. bases.  On May 23, 2005, Karzai and President Bush issued
a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military
facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle
against violent extremism.”  The joint statement did not spell out any permanent
stationing of U.S. bases in Afghanistan, nor did the statement give Karzai his
requested increased control over facilities used by the U.S. forces, over U.S.
operations, or over the disposition of prisoners taken in the course of operations.  
Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that are used in support of U.S.
operations in Afghanistan and that could form part of a longer-term U.S. presence
include the following. 
! Bagram Air Base north of Kabul, where many of the U.S. troops in
Afghanistan are based,33 as well as thirteen other airfields around
Afghanistan that handle the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters)
in the country.  The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides a
total of about $52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities
at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, but
a $57 million fuel storage tank farm for Bagram was not
appropriated.  
! Qandahar airfield, just outside that city, which bases about 500 U.S.
military personnel.  The FY2005 supplemental provides $16 million
for an ammunition supply facility at Qandahar.  
! Karshi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan houses about 1,750 U.S.
military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian), and
is mostly a supply hub for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.  No combat
missions are flown from there, according to U.S. officers, and U.S.
use of the base has been reduced since May 2005 following a
government crackdown on unrest in the city of Andijon.  State
Department criticism of the crackdown prompted strains in U.S.-
Uzbekistan relations.  P.L. 109-13 appropriates $42.5 million to
upgrade the airbase, including runway improvement.  
! The Peter Ganci base at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan has about
1,000 U.S. military personnel, as well as refueling and cargo aircraft.
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Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in a revolution
against former President Askar Akayev, but the new leadership says
the U.S. use of the base will not be affected. 
! Several bases in the Persian Gulf are used to support the Afghanistan
mission, including Al Dhafra in the UAE, Al Udeid in Qatar, and
several airfields in Oman.  P.L. 109-13 appropriates $1.4 million to
upgrade Al Dhafra. 
! On April 21, 2005, Turkey said it would extend for another year an
agreement allowing the United States to use Incirlik air base to
supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
OEF Costs and Casualties.  As of June 14, 2005, about 195  U.S. military
personnel have been killed in OEF including from enemy fire, friendly fire, and non-
hostile deaths (accidents).  No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan
civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths.  On July
1,  2002, a U.S. air-strike on suspected Taliban leaders in Uruzgan Province
mistakenly killed about 40 civilians.
Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be relatively
stable at about $900 million to $1 billion per month.  About $13 billion in
incremental costs were incurred in FY2002.  The FY2004 supplemental
appropriation provided about $11 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom for
FY2004 (P.L. 108-106).  Supplemental FY2005 funds for Afghanistan combat were
provided in P.L. 108-287 and P.L. 109-13.34 
International Security Force (ISAF)/NATO.35  The Bonn Agreement  and
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) created an international
peacekeeping force for Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF).  Its mandate was initially limited to Kabul but is now broadening as
NATO/ISAF assumes control over additional provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs,
see below).  ISAF’s baseline force was about  6,400 troops  from all 26 NATO
countries, plus 11 non-NATO countries but force levels increased to about 9,000 to
help secure the October 9, 2004 elections.  That level has now fallen back to under
8,500,36 but it will again increase by about 2,000 (a Dutch battalion in Mazar, a
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Romanian battalion in Kabul, and Spanish troops in Herat) to help secure the
September 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections.  Table 5, an appendix at the
end of this report, contains a table listing each contributing country to ISAF and the
number of forces being contributed.  
NATO’s role in Afghanistan has been expanding since August 2003, when it
took command of ISAF.  This commitment put to rest the perpetual difficulty of
identifying a lead country for ISAF each six-month period.  NATO took over from
Germany and the Netherlands.37 NATO’s assumption of command intensified
discussions about whether ISAF should  deploy to other major cities, a mission the
Afghan government long  favored.38  The Bush Administration initially favored
reliance on alternative security efforts, but it later agreed to  ISAF expansion if
enough troops could be contributed.  In early October 2003, NATO endorsed a plan
to expand its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval.
That decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to contribute an additional
450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz.  On October 14,
2003, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510, formally authorizing ISAF
to deploy outside Kabul.  (Additional long-term NATO involvement in Afghanistan
is a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report.)
Currently, the core of ISAF is the Kabul Multinational Brigade (4,400
personnel), which was headed by Canada until August 2004, then by the
“Eurocorps,” a rapid response force composed of forces from France, Germany,
Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg.  Turkey took over the lead as of February 2005,
and Turkey has augmented its force to 1,800 accordingly.  At the headquarters level,
there are 600 personnel from 15 contributing nations.  ISAF coordinates with Afghan
security forces and  with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of
Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul international airport.  The
United States contributes a small amount of force to ISAF (194 troops), primarily to
coordinate U.S. military  assistance to it.  
ISAF - OEF Mission Merger.  In concert with NATO/ISAF’s expanded role,
there is a growing consensus within NATO that the ISAF peacekeeping and OEF
combat missions should be combined.  In February 2005, in conjunction with
meetings between European leaders and Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, NATO and the United States said they would eventually merge
the two  missions,  possibly as early as 2006.  It is unlikely, however, that even U.S.
forces would withdraw from Afghanistan if such a mission merge took place.  Some
NATO countries, including Germany and France, are reluctant to shift their missions
to combat rather than peacekeeping, and U.S. commanders are said to remain
skeptical about whether NATO is able to conduct a combat mission effectively.
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Some observers also want  NATO/ISAF to assume a role in counter-narcotics
missions.  In June 2005, it was reported that British troop levels would increase to
enable Britain to step up its anti-Taliban, anti-narcotics mission in concert with U.S.
forces performing similar missions in southeastern Afghanistan  
  Personnel and equipment shortages have plagued NATO’s  ability to build up
in Afghanistan.  In an effort to address staffing and equipment shortages, in
December 2003, NATO announced new pledges for ISAF operations:  12 helicopters
from Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey; six aircraft from various nations; an
infantry company from Norway’s Telemark battalion, troops from the Czech
Republic, intelligence officers from Italy, Romania, and other countries, and airport
traffic controllers from Belgium and Iceland.  For the most part, the personnel and
equipment have now arrived.  
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).  The U.S. military has
increasingly focused on fostering secure conditions for reconstruction.  The
cornerstone of that effort, inaugurated in mid-December 2002, is the concept of the
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs).  PRTs are military-run  enclaves that provide
safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend
the writ of the Kabul government throughout Afghanistan by attaching to the PRTs
Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel.  PRT activities can range from
resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects.  Each U.S.-run
PRT is composed of U.S. forces, Defense Department civil affairs officers,
representatives of U.S. aid and other agencies, and allied personnel.  Most PRTs,
including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces.
There are now 21 PRTs in operation, of which 11 are U.S.-run.  Each has  about
50-100 military personnel, although some coalition partners deploy larger forces than
that at the PRTs they run.  The U.S.-run PRTs are in Gardez, Ghazni, Parwan,
Qandahar, Jalalabad, Khost, Qalat, Asadabad, Tarin Kowt, Lashkar Gah, and
Sharana. 
Partner countries now run ten PRTs, and plans are for the remaining U.S.-run
PRTs to eventually be taken over by NATO/ISAF, freeing up U.S. (and British)
forces for combat in areas where there is insurgency and narcotics trafficking.  As of
June 2005, partner countries run ten PRTs, following the takeover by Italy and Spain
of  U.S. PRTs in Herat and Farah, in western Afghanistan.  The two countries also
established  a “Forward Support Base” in Herat Province to serve those two PRTs as
well as two new ones formed at  Gaghcharan (capital of Ghor Province, led by
Lithuania), and Qaleh-ye Now (capital of Badghis Province, led by Spain).  The new
PRTs require adding a total of 500 troops to NATO/ISAF’s force in Afghanistan.
The other partner-run PRTs are in Konduz (led by Germany); Mazar-e-Sharif (led by
Britain); Faizabad (as a satellite of Germany’s Konduz PRT); Meymaneh (led by
U.K., Norway, and Finland); and Baghlan (led by Netherlands).  New Zealand
deploys 120 military personnel to run an OEF-run PRT in Bamiyan, not under
NATO/ISAF auspices.  In addition, U.K. forces have formed three satellites of the
Mazar PRT:  in Sari Pol, Samangan, and Shebergan. 
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In future deployments, Canada is moving 1,250 troops to Afghanistan to take
over the U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar, and the Netherlands reportedly might take over
a U.S.-run PRT in southeastern Afghanistan.  Sweden is reportedly offering to take
over the British-run PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif to free up British forces to take over
some U.S. PRTs in the more restive south and east and to perform combat missions
in that area.  U.S. plans are to eventually establish PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces. 
Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began,
fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.39  However, other relief
groups do not want to associate with any military force because doing so might taint
their perceived neutrality.  In February 2004, U.S. commanders unveiled an
additional concept for “regional development zones (RDZ),” areas of operations that
might group several PRTs, in an effort to promote reconstruction and Afghan
governance.  A pilot RDZ was established in Qandahar, composed of a strongly pro-
Kabul governor working with U.S. troops and Afghan national police and Afghan
National Army forces.  One intention of the concept is to devolve security decision-
making to U.S. commanders in the regions, rather than at U.S. headquarters in Kabul.
The FY2004 supplemental appropriations provided $50 million in Economic
Support Funds (ESF) for “PRT projects” (P.L. 108-106).  The conference report on
the FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) says that ESF for PRT reconstruction-related
programs are provided ($87 million was requested for this function).  
Afghan National Army (ANA).  U.S. Special Operations Forces, in
partnership with French, British, and other partner forces,  are  training the new
ANA.  U.S. officers in Afghanistan say the ANA is beginning to become a major
force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol.  As of June 2005, the ANA
exceeds 23,000 troops, according to U.S. fact sheets.  On the other hand, about
31,000 have been trained to date, suggesting that some desertion or absentee problem
persists.  U.S. commanders have set a goal of 33,5000 ANA soldiers for 2006, and
the ultimate size of the army is to be 70,000 by 2007.  The United States is also
building four bases for the ANA, according to U.S. officials.  The bases are in Herat,
Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif.  
The ANA began its first deployments in December 2002.  Thus far, by all
accounts, it has been welcomed by local populations as a symbol of a unified future
for Afghanistan.  The ANA has now established a presence in most of  Afghanistan’s
34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers.  The
ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there, and to
Maimana in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city.
Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part
of a “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul.
There had been reports, at the time the United States first began establishing the
ANA, that Northern Alliance figures were weighting recruitment for the national
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army toward his Tajik ethnic base.  Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment
or left the ANA program.  U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been
alleviated with better pay and more involvement by U.S. special forces, as well as the
appointment of additional Pashtuns in senior Defense Ministry positions.40  The
naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004
could also reduce desertions and absenteeism among Pashtuns.  U.S. officers in
Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds
to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence.  Fully trained
recruits are paid about $70 per month.  The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation for
Afghanistan (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that ANA recruits be
vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug
trafficking. 
An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior
to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly.  It has
about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft.  Russia
overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain.  In
May 2005, representatives of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said
the United States is considering obtaining for Afghanistan additional transport planes
and helicopters, although the equipment might not necessarily be U.S. equipment,
according to DSCA.  Afghan pilots are based at Bagram Airfield.  Afghanistan is
seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in
Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the more than two decades of warfare in
Afghanistan. 
Funding and Armament.  Thus far, weaponry for the ANA has come
primarily from Defense Ministry weapons stocks — with the concurrence of former
Defense Minister Fahim who controlled those stocks — from international donors,
primarily from the former East bloc,41 and from the disarmament program discussed
below.  The United States has provided some trucks, M-113 armored personnel
carriers, and other equipment as excess defense articles (EDA), and plans to provide
additional articles and services, according to statements by U.S. officials.  In
December 2004, President Bush authorized (Presidential Determination 2004-15) the
draw-down from U.S. stocks of $135 million worth of U.S. defense articles and
services, including training.  
The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) provided $287 million
in foreign military financing (FMF) to accelerate ANA development, allocated as
follows: $146 million for infrastructure; $78 million for equipment; $40.7 million for
“sustainment” (ANA salaries); $13 million for training; and $9 million for
transportation.  The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) earmarked
$400 million in FMF for the ANA.  The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
provides the requested $1.285 billion for DOD operations to train and equip the
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ANA.  Of that amount, $290 million is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already
obligated to train and equip the Afghan forces.  
National Guard.  In early 2004, because of the slow pace of expanding the
ANA, the Bush Administration reportedly formulated a plan to build up a “national
guard” to supplement the ANA.42  The national guard apparently will consist
primarily of regional militia forces; it would report to OEF.  This plan might appear
to conflict with the Administration’s plan to build up the Kabul government and
weaken regional militias, although the Administration reportedly believes this plan
could better bring militia forces under central control.  
National Police.  Some Afghan officials believe that building up a credible
and capable national police force is at least as important as building the ANA.  Some
do not believe the ANA should have a role in maintaining internal security, and that
this should be the role of the police.  
The United States and Germany are training the Afghan National Police (ANP)
force.  About 38,000 ANP are on duty, and that number is expected to reach 62,000
by mid-2006.  Germany is focusing on police commander training, and it has trained
about 3,700 police commanders thus far, with another 1,500 in training.  There are
five training centers around Afghanistan, with two more to be established.  Some
national police have begun to dismantle factional checkpoints in some major cities,
according to U.S. officers in Afghanistan.  Part of the training consists of courses in
human rights principles and democratic policing concepts.  On the other hand, some
U.S. commanders believe the ANP need additional training because police
mishandled the riots in Jalalabad in May 2005, started over rumors of the
mishandling of the Quran at the Guantanamo Bay prison facility.  Moreover, the
ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local
factional or ethnic disputes. 
The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry
to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities.
According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the
first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police
of Afghanistan.  U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol
forces.  The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides $360 million (of $400
million requested) in State Department INL funds to train Afghan police. 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR).  Japan, the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Kingdom,
and Canada, with participation of the United States are leading (funding and
implementing) an effort to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) into society
fighters from individual militias.  The DDR program is intended to undercut the
strength of regional strongmen relative to the central government.  The program got
off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not enact mandated
reforms (primarily reduction of the number of Tajiks in senior positions) by the
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targeted July 1, 2003, date.  In September 2003, Karzai took action on the issue,
replacing  22 senior Tajik officials in the Defense Ministry with officials of Pashtuns,
Uzbek, and Hazara ethnicity.  
The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters.
However, lists of fighters submitted by regional leaders in June 2004 identified about
60,000 total to be demobilized.  According to the UNAMA on June 13, 2005,
virtually all of the 60,000 militia fighters identified have been disarmed.  Of that
total, 49,000 have begun exercising their reintegration options:  training, starting
small businesses, and other options.  The program got a boost from the ousting of
Ismail Khan as Herat governor in August 2004; he permitted many of his militiamen
to enter the DDR program after he was removed.  In addition, there is now a pool of
perhaps 100,000 members of  “illegal armed groups,” to be disarmed; these are
unofficial militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces.  The program to
disarm them is called the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG).  Some
studies have criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of
rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some
militiamen in security programs run by the United States and its partners.43 
A related program is the surrender and cantonment of heavy weapons possessed
by major factions.  According to UNAMA, at least 33,500 medium and light
weapons have been collected as of June 8, 2005.  Of these, 13,400 pieces have been
transferred to the ANA.  About 9,054 heavy weapons (tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and artillery pieces)  have been collected; this is nearly all of the heavy
weapons believed controlled by militia forces, although there are still believed to be
about 220 heavy weapons pieces uncollected in Shindand, Farah, and Konduz.
Heavy weapons cantonment was completed in Kabul in January 2005 because Fahim
submitted the heavy weapons under his control — including the weapons kept in the
Northern Alliance stronghold of the Panjshir Valley.  The final weapons submitted
by him included the last four Scud missiles that were under his control, along with
70 tanks and 20 artillery pieces.  As noted above, the U.K.-led PRT in Mazar-e-
Sharif has collected and (along with the ANA) is guarding some heavy weapons
(tanks, artillery) from Dostam and rival factions in northern Afghanistan. 
The FY2004 supplemental requested $60 million for DDR operations.
However,  $30 million was provided in that law (P.L. 108-106) because it is expected
that Japan might contribute additional funds.  
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Regional Context
Even before September 11, several of Afghanistan’s neighbors were becoming
alarmed about security threats emanating from Afghanistan.  Some experts believe
that the neighboring governments are now attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s
factions to their advantage, despite the signing on  December 23,  2002 of a non-
interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) by six of Afghanistan’s neighbors.  
Pakistan44
Pakistan publicly ended its support for the Taliban in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 attacks, although questions persist about Pakistan’s commitment
to preventing Taliban remnants from operating there.  Pakistan initially saw the
Taliban movement as an instrument with which to build an Afghan central
government strong enough to prevent fragmentation of Afghanistan while at the same
time sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival
India.  It had been the most public defender of the Taliban movement and was one
of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others)
to formally recognize it as the legitimate government.  Pakistan saw Afghanistan as
essential to opening up trade relations and energy routes with the Muslim states of
the former Soviet Union.  
Prior to the September 11 attacks, General Pervez  Musharraf, who took power
in an October 1999 coup,  resisted U.S. pressure to forcefully intercede with the
Taliban leadership to achieve bin Laden’s extradition.  U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1333, of  December 19, 2000, was partly an effort by the United States
and Russia to compel Pakistan to cease military advice and aid to the Taliban.
Pakistan, for the most part,  abided by the resolution, including ordering the Taliban
to cut the staff at its embassy in Pakistan.45 
Pakistan’s pre-September 11 steps against the Taliban reflected increasing
wariness that the Taliban movement was radicalizing existing Islamic movements
inside Pakistan and that its support for the Taliban was propelling the United States
into a closer relationship with India.  These considerations, coupled with U.S. offers
of economic benefit, prompted Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. response to the
September 11 attacks.  Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to
Pakistani airspace, ports, airfields.  Pakistan also has arrested over 550 Al Qaeda
fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United States.
Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured
April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh September 11, 2002);
top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March  2003); and most recently
a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
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Following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against Musharraf,
Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are
suspected of harboring the militants.  In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces
began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the
Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other
indirect support.  Pakistan said it was winding down the combat in December 2004
and it publicly denied that it had allowed the United States to set up intelligence
bases in the Waziristan area as part of the search for bin Laden and other Al Qaeda
leaders.46  Pakistan’s forces are now poised near the north Waziristan area of
Pakistan, and the U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that it is training
Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.47  
At the same time, Pakistan has sought to protect its interests by fashioning a
strong Pashtun-based component for a post-Taliban government.  Pakistan is wary
that a government dominated by the Northern Alliance would be backed by India,
which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and
recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents.  Some U.S. and Afghan officials continue to accuse
Pakistan of allowing Taliban fighters and activists to meet and group in Pakistani
cities, and they call on Pakistan to track down and arrest Taliban members as
vigorously as it tracks members of Al Qaeda.  Pakistan says it is too difficult to
distinguish Afghan Taliban from Pakistani nationals, but President Musharraf
promised, at a meeting with Karzai on August 23, 2004, to prevent militants in
Pakistan from disrupting Afghanistan’s October 9 presidential elections.  There are
some indications Pakistan implemented that pledge, and Pakistan has sought to
improve relations further now that Karzai has won a free election.  
Despite the improving climate between these neighbors, there are occasional
border clashes, apparently caused by the lack of clear border delineation, and the
presence of independent armed factions on the Afghan side of the border or
aggressive commanders on the Pakistani side.  The most recent border clash was on
January 4, 2005.  Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide
by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir
Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in
1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later
Pakistan after the 1947 partition).  As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan
refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell.  About 300,000 Afghan
refugees remain in Pakistan.  
Iran
Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional
influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the
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Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority.  Iranian firms are also
profiting from reconstruction work in western Afghanistan.  Iran has long been
politically close to the Northern Alliance, and remains so.  Iran has confirmed that
it offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war, and
it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran.  However,
some Iranian leaders were harshly critical of U.S. military action, referring to the
action as a U.S. war on Islam.
Iran saw  the Taliban as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after
Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September
1995.  Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously,
providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition,48 and hosting fighters loyal
to Ismail Khan, who was  captured by the Taliban in 1998 but escaped and fled to
Iran in March 2000.  In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into
direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the
course of Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan.  Iran massed forces at the
border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash,
possibly because Iran lacked confidence in its military capabilities or out of fear that
Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban.
Amid reports Iran seeks to exert influence over the new government by  arming
pro-Iranian Afghan factions, in early January 2002 President Bush warned Iran
against  meddling in Afghanistan.  Since then, the Bush Administration has continued
to accuse Iran of  trying to build influence over the interim government  and of failing
to send Al Qaeda leaders in Iran back to their countries of origin for trial.  Partly in
response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, although it did not arrest him and allowed him to return to
Afghanistan.  For his part, Karzai has said that Iran is an important neighbor of
Afghanistan and visited Iran in late February 2002, pledging to build ties with the
Islamic republic.  Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan
in September 2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the western
Afghan air base of Shindand, 20 miles from the Iranian border.49  Iran is said to be
helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border.  About
300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2
million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society. 
Russia
A number of considerations might explain why Russia mostly supported the
U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  Russia’s main objective in Afghanistan
has been to prevent the further strengthening of Islamic or nationalist movements in
the Central Asian states or Islamic enclaves in Russia itself, including Chechnya.
Russia’s fear became acute following an August 1999 incursion into Russia’s
Dagestan region by Islamic guerrillas from neighboring Chechnya.  Some reports link
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at least one faction of the guerrillas to Al Qaeda.50  This faction was led by a Chechen
of Arab origin who is referred to by the name “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab),
although there are some reports Russia may have killed him in Chechnya in 2002.
In January 2000, the Taliban government became the only government in the world
to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting
alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed. 
The U.S. and Russian positions on the Taliban coincided well before the
September 11 attacks.51  Russia supported  the Northern Alliance with some military
equipment and technical assistance.52  U.S.-Russian cooperation led to the passage
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267 and 1233 (see section on “Harboring of
Al Qaeda, below).  On the other hand, the United States has not blindly supported
Russia’s apparent attempts to place a large share of the blame for the rebellion in
Chechnya on the Taliban or Al Qaeda.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse
of those of Pakistan.  India’s goal has been to deny Afghanistan from becoming a
provider of “strategic depth” to Pakistan.  In India’s view, Pakistan is attempting to
keep some Taliban elements active because Pakistan believes the United States might
some day depart the region, and Pakistan might want to have the option of installing
another pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan.53  India strongly supported the
Northern Alliance in its civil war against the Pakistan-backed Taliban in the mid
1990s.  India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself
because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan
dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir.  Some of these
organizations have committed major acts of terrorism in India.  India denies
Pakistan’s allegations that it is recruiting anti-Pakistan insurgents in Afghanistan
through its diplomatic facilities or other means.  
India is currently considering co-financing, along with the Asian Development
Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan.  In other signs of cooperation,
in January 2005 India, among other joint projects announced, promised to help
Afghanistan’s struggling Ariana national airline and to begin India Air flights from
Delhi to Kabul. 
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Central Asian States
During Taliban rule, leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan grew
increasingly alarmed that Central Asian radical Islamic movements were receiving
safe haven in Afghanistan.  In 1996, several of these states banded together  with
Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization to discuss the threat emanating from Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.
The organization groups China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan; Karzai attended its meeting in April 2004 signaling the possible eventual
entry of Afghanistan into the grouping.  Of the Central Asian states that border
Afghanistan, two of them — Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — had seen themselves as
particularly vulnerable to militants harbored by the Taliban.  Uzbekistan saw its ally,
Abdul Rashid Dostam, the Uzbek commander in northern Afghanistan, lose most of
his influence in 1998.54  
Uzbekistan has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in
Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.55  One
of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al
Qaeda forces in the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001.  Uzbekistan was
highly supportive of the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks and
placed military facilities — mostly notably Karshi Khanabad air base, discussed
above   — at U.S. disposal for use in the combat against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Uzbek officials in Tashkent told CRS in May 2002 that the defeat of the Taliban has
made them less anxious about the domestic threat from the IMU, and press reports
say the IMU has been severely weakened by its war defeats and Namangani’s death.
Tajikistan feared that its buffer with Afghanistan would disappear if the Taliban
defeated the Northern Alliance, whose territorial base borders Tajikistan.  Some of
the IMU members based in Afghanistan, including Namangani, fought alongside the
Islamic opposition United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the 1994-1997 civil war
in that country.  Tajikistan, heavily influenced by Russia, was initially reluctant to
allow the United States the use of military facilities in Tajikistan.  However, on
September 26, 2001, Moscow officially endorsed the use by the United States of
three air bases in Tajikistan, paving the way for Tajikistan to open facilities for U.S.
use, which it did formally offer in early November 2001.  In July 2003, Afghanistan
and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train some Afghan military
officers in Tajikistan.  There are concerns that much of the opium grown in
Afghanistan might be flowing through Tajikistan; Lt. Gen. Barno visited Tajikistan
in April 2005 to discuss this issue, in concert with the increased U.S. military role in
Afghan counter-narcotics efforts.  
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Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan.  However, IMU
guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.56  As
noted above, since December 2001 Kyrgyzstan has hosted U.S. air operations at
Manas airport.  Kazakhstan had begun to diplomatically engage the Taliban over the
year prior to the September 11 attacks, but it publicly supported the U.S. war effort
against the Taliban.  Kazakhstan signed an agreement with the United States in July
2002 to allow coalition aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airports in case of an emergency
or short term need related to the ongoing war in Afghanistan.  
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose
to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly
viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical
Islamic activity from Afghanistan.  Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad  Niyazov,
saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan.  However, the September 11 events stoked
Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly
supported the U.S.-led war.  No OEF forces have been based in Turkmenistan.  
China
China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan
corridor” (see map) and had become increasingly concerned about the potential for
Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in
northwestern China.  A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in
the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials.  China expressed its concern
through active membership in  the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as noted
above.  In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban
policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar.
Although it has long been concerned about the threat from the Taliban and bin
Laden, China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the
Taliban.  Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic
considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby.  In addition, China has
been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China.  Pakistan’s
cooperation with OEF appeared to allay China’s opposition to U.S. military action.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions.  Saudi
Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the
Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government.
The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, with which
Saudi Arabia has been at odds since Iran’s 1979 revolution, but Iranian-Saudi
relations improved dramatically beginning in 1997 and balancing Iranian power
ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan.  
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Drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war, Saudi
Arabia  worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi
activities by Al Qaeda.  Saudi Arabia apparently believed  that Al Qaeda’s presence
in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself and
thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime.  Some press reports
indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on,
a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate.
Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996
to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that he could become a
rallying point for opposition to the regime.  In March 2000 and again in May 2000,
the Saudi-based Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) sponsored indirect peace
talks in Saudi Arabia between the warring factions.  
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia generally cooperated with the U.S.
war effort.  It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and
quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air
operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit  U.S. aircraft to launch strikes in
Afghanistan from Saudi bases.  The Saudi position has generally been to allow the
United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized.
Residual Issues from Past Conflicts 
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict.
Among them are the “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles provided to the mujahedin during
the Soviet occupation, and the elimination of land mines.
Stinger Retrieval.  Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate,
the Reagan Administration provided “hundreds” of man-portable “Stinger” anti-
aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and
aircraft.  Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common
estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large in Afghanistan out of
about 2,000 provided during the war against the Soviet Union, although more recent
estimates put the number below 100.57  The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction
with 2001 U.S. war effort, when  U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some
Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war.  No hits were reported.  Any Stingers that
survived the anti-Taliban war were controlled by Afghans now allied to the United
States and presumably posed less of a threat.  However, there are continued concerns
that remaining Stingers could be sold to terrorists for use against civilian airliners.
In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States
“dozens” of Stingers.58  In late January 2005, the Afghan intelligence service began
a new push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.59 
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The practical difficulties of retrieving the weapons had caused this issue to fade
from the U.S. agenda for Afghanistan during the 1990s.  In 1992, after the fall of the
Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about
$10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin
commanders.  The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back
effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including
Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994
in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort.  On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post
reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction of the at-large Stingers.  Many
observers speculate that the CIA program retrieved perhaps 50 or 100 of them.
The lingering danger of these weapons has become apparent on several
occasions.  Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S.
helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah, according to
press reports in January 2002.  India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic
rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian
helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.60  It was not the Stinger but Soviet-made SA-7
“Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a
U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger
aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002.  Both missed their targets.  SA-7s have
been discovered in Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces, most recently in December 2002.
Mine Eradication.  Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute
one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people.  The United Nations estimates that
5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates
by outside organizations are significantly lower.  An estimated 400,000 Afghans have
been killed or wounded by land mines.  U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and
commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul.  As shown in the U.S. aid
table for FY1999-FY2002, the U.S. de-mining program was providing about $3
million per year for Afghanistan, and the amount escalated to about $7 million in the
post-Taliban period.  Most of the funds went to HALO Trust, a British organization,
and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan.  
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan
The war-ravaged Afghan economy and society deteriorated further under
Taliban rule.  In addition to 3.6 million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led
war,61 another 500,000 Afghans were displaced internally even before U.S. military
action began, according to Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001, report on
Afghanistan.  Many of the displaced persons had fled the effects of a major drought
that affected the 85% of the population that directly depends on agriculture.  The
conflicts in Afghanistan, including the war against the Soviet Union, left about 2
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The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds
were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency
Response Fund.
million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans and about one million Afghan children
who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan.  However, over 3
million Afghan refugees have returned since January 2002.  A variety of U.N.
agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) serve as the vehicles for
international assistance to Afghanistan.  The U.N. High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) supervises Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Afghan repatriation.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of
assistance to the Afghan people, even during Taliban rule.  No U.S. aid went directly
to the Taliban government; monies were provided through recognized NGOs and
relief organizations.  During 1985-1994, the United States did have a cross-border
aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was distributed in Afghanistan via
U.S. aid workers in Pakistan.  However, citing  the difficulty of administering a
cross-border program, there was  no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end
of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in late 2001.  Table 1 breaks
down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program.  For a history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan
prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998), see Table 3.62
Post-Taliban/FY2002-2004.  On October 4, 2001, in an effort to demonstrate
that the United States had an interest in the welfare of the Afghan people and not just
the defeat of the Taliban, President Bush announced that humanitarian aid to the
Afghan people would total about $320 million for FY2002.  After the fall of the
Taliban, at a donors’ conference in Tokyo during January 20-21, 2002, the United
States pledged $296 million in reconstruction aid for Afghanistan for FY2002.  The
amounts provided for FY2002, FY2003, and FY2004  are shown in the tables below.
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments.  An
authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized the following:
! $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $30 million in assistance for political development, including
national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for
FY2003-FY2005);
! $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights
oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-
2006  to the National Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan);
! $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
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! $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for
Afghanistan and regional militaries.  (The original law provided for
$300 million in drawdowns.  That was increased to $450 million by
P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and
! $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand
ISAF if such an expansion takes place. 
The total authorization, for all categories for all years, is over $3.7 billion.  For
the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets
authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations.
However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion has
been funded by contributing nations, not U.S. appropriations. 
A bill, S. 2845 (P.L. 108-458, signed December 17, 2004), the version of
legislation to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contains a
subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.”  The
subtitle mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and
contains provisions requiring additional Administration reports to Congress on
progress in reconstruction: (1) a report on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of
reconstruction, an amendment to the report required in the original version of this
law; (2) a report on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) a report on U.S. efforts to
persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State
and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.
The law also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more
rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and new initiatives to combat narcotics
trafficking.  The law does not specify dollar amounts for U.S. aid  for FY2005 and
FY2006, authorizing “such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years
2005 and 2006.”
FY2006 Regular Request.  As noted in the sections above, on February 14,
2005, the Administration requested additional funds for Afghanistan for FY2005.
Aside from the appropriation for U.S. military operations, the total appropriated in
P.L. 109-13 is $3.352 billion, earmarked as follows:  
! $1.285 billion for DOD to equip and train Afghan security forces;
! $242 million for DOD counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan;
! $1.086 billion in ESF for reconstruction and democracy and
governance;
! $260 million for INL counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan;
! $360 million for INL police training;
! $17.1 million for Karzai protection (NADR funds);
! $34 million in Commanders Emergency Response (CERP) funds,
mostly for counter-narcotics activity;
! $7.7 million for DEA operations in Afghanistan; and
! $60 million for operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul. 
The regular request for FY2006 requests a total of $920 million, as follows: $43
million for child survival and health; $430 million to train and equip the ANA; $260
million for State Department police training and counter-narcotics; $18 million for
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Karzai protection; $18 million for peacekeeping operations; and $150 million for
“other.”  
Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance.  In addition to providing U.S.
foreign assistance, since 2002 the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign
Assets Control, OFAC) unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan
government-owned  banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed
on the Taliban in 1999 (see below).  These funds have been used by the new
government for currency stabilization, not for recurring costs of the interim
government.  Most of the funds consisted of gold that is held in Afghanistan’s name
in the United States to back up Afghanistan’s currency.  Together with its allies, over
$350 million in frozen funds have been released to the new government.  In January
2002, the United States  agreed to provide $50 million in credit for U.S. investment
in Afghanistan, provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
On March 7, 2003, OPIC pledged an additional $50 million, bringing the total line
of credit to $100 million. The United States also has successfully pressed the
International Air Transport Association to pay Afghanistan $20 million in overflight
fees that were withheld because of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban.  In April 2002,
OFAC unblocked $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets.  
World Bank/Asian Development Bank.  In May 2002, the World Bank
reopened its office in Afghanistan after twenty years.  On March 12, 2003, it
announced a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979.  In August 2003,
the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate
the telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation
in Kabul. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in
Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in
project insurance for Afghanistan.  Since December 2002, the bank has loaned
Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance,
and agricultural development.  The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90
million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy
sector.  One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from
Qandahar to the border with Pakistan.  In December 2004, the Bank approved an
additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections of the road system.
International Reconstruction Pledges.  Afghan leaders say that
Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010.  At a 2002 Tokyo
donors’ conference, total pledges for reconstruction amounted to $2 billion for 2002
and $4.5 billion over five years, as follows: European Union, $495 million in 2002;
Japan, $500 million over 30 months; Germany, $362 million over four years; Saudi
Arabia, $220 million over three years; Iran, $560 million over five years;  Pakistan,
$100 million over five years; India, a $100 million line of credit; South Korea, $45
million over 30 months; and United Kingdom, $86 million in 2002.  In March 2003,
the EU announced an additional $410 million donation for 2003-2004.  This is in
addition to its contribution, noted above, for 2002. 
In April 2004 international donors meeting in Berlin pledged $8.2 billion for
Afghanistan for 2004-2006, of which about $4.5 billion was to be provided in 2004.
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63 “Afghanistan’s Top Donors to Pledge Nine Billion Dollars — Report.”  Agence France
Presse, March 11, 2004. 
64 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
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The United States committed about $2.9 for the whole period.63  Other pledges for
2004-2006 included European Union ($2.2 billion); Canada (200 million); Japan
($400 million); World Bank loans ($900 million); Asia Development Bank loans
($560 million); India ($225 million); and Iran ($155 million).  
Another donors’ meeting was held in Kabul on April 4, 2005, primarily to
reaffirm and structure previous pledges rather than attract new promises of aid.  At
the meeting, Afghan leaders insisted that international aid be channeled through the
Afghan government, curbing the prerogatives of NGOs in assisting the Afghan
people.  This call reflected the view of many Afghan ministers, including Finance
Minister Anwar al-Ahady, that the NGOs have become a virtual “parallel
government” of Afghanistan and are not accountable to the Afghan government.  No
firm commitments were made, although the United States and Britain expressed
receptivity to the request. 
Domestically Generated Funds.  Obtaining control over revenues has been
a key U.S. and Kabul goal.  In May 2003, Karzai insisted that regional governors
remit some of their privately collected customs revenue to the central government.
Twelve regional leaders did so, subsequently giving $100 million to Kabul.  Kabul
raised internally about $210 million of its $600 million budget for the fiscal year
ended March 2004, and funds are increasingly being collected and handled by the
central government. Karzai has sought to reassure international donors by
establishing a transparent budget and planning process. 
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development.  In an effort to find a
long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian problems, the United States
has tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan
living standards and political stability over the long term.  During 1996-98, the
Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through
western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate.  One
proposal by a consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation64 was for a
Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) that would originate at the Turkmenistan-
Uzbekistan border and extend through the western region of Afghanistan to Pakistan.
A $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas) would originate in southern
Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions
into India.
The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for
the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power.  Immediately after the August
20,1998 U.S. strikes on bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan, Unocal suspended all its
Afghan pipeline-related activities, including a U.S.-based training program for
Afghans who were expected to work on the project.  With few prospects of improved
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U.S. relations with Taliban, Unocal withdrew from its consortium in December 1998.
Saudi Delta Oil was made interim project leader, although Delta lacked the financing
and technology to make the consortium viable.  The rival consortium led by Bridas
of Argentina continued to try to win the project.  
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period.  In a summit
meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project.  Sponsors of
the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a
series of preliminary agreements.  They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, although
financing for the project is unclear.  Some U.S. officials view this project as a
superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO
Membership.  The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war
economic rebound.  The Afghan economy grew 30% in 2002, 25% in 2003, and it
is expected to grow 20% in 2004, according to Karzai.  Following a meeting with
Karzai on June 15, 2004, President Bush announced the United States and
Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement
(TIFA).  These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader but more
complex bilateral free trade agreement.  On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries
of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan.
Lifting of U.S. and International Sanctions.  Shoring up a post-Taliban
government of Afghanistan with financial and other assistance required waivers of
restrictions or the permanent modification of  U.S. and U.N. sanctions previously
imposed on Afghanistan.  Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on
Afghanistan have now been lifted. 
! On May 2, 1980, Afghanistan was deleted from the list of designated
beneficiary countries under the U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), denying Afghanistan’s exports duty free
treatment, by Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).  This was
done under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended [P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. § 2464].  On January 10, 2003, the
President signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary
of GSP, eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. 
! On June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union
for the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States imposed controls
on exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products, oil and gas
exploration and production equipment, and phosphates.  This was
implemented at 15 C.F.R. Part 373 et seq (45 F.R. 37415) under the
authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of
1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].  On April 24,
1981, these sanctions were modified to terminate controls on U.S.
exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates.
! In mid-1992, the George H.W.  Bush Administration determined that
Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.”  This
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opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the
U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to
Afghanistan.
! On October 7, 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued
Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a
Marxist-Leninist country.  That designation had prohibited
Afghanistan from receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees,
insurance, or credits for purchases under Sec. 8 of the 1986 Export-
Import Bank Act, which amended Section 2(b)(2) of the Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173, 12 U.S.C. § 635).  However,
President George H.W. Bush’s determination was not implemented
before he left office. 
! President George H.W.  Bush’s  October 7, 1992 determination (93-
3) also found that assistance to Afghanistan under Section 620D of
the Foreign Assistance Act is in the national interest of the United
States because of the change of regime in Afghanistan.  The
presidential determination, had it been implemented in regulations,
would have waived restrictions on assistance to Afghanistan
provided for in the act, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. § 2374];
as added by Section 505 of the International Development
Cooperation Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-53].  These provisions prohibit
foreign assistance to Afghanistan until it apologizes for the death of
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs, who was kidnapped
in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout
where he was held, unless the President determines that such
assistance is in the national interest because of changed
circumstances in Afghanistan.  This restriction has consistently  been
waived since the fall of the Taliban.  P.L. 108-458 (9/11
Commission recommendations) repeals this  restriction outright.  
! Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986
[P.L. 99-190] authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan.  Under that
law, on February 18, 1986, the height of the Soviet occupation,
President Reagan had issued Presidential Proclamation 5437,
suspending (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287).  On
May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the
products of Afghanistan.
! On March 31, 1993, President Clinton, on national interest grounds,
waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87-195]; as amended and
restated by Section 2005(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
[P.L. 99-570].  The waiver was renewed in 1994.  Mandatory
sanctions include bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial
of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for
multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S.
sugar quota.  Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP;
CRS-47
additional duties on country exports to the United States; and
curtailment of air transportation with the United States.  On February
25, 2002, President Bush waived restrictions on FY2002 aid to
Afghanistan under this act. 
! On June 14, 1996, Afghanistan was formally added to the list of
countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports
of U.S. defense articles and services.  This amended the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR Part 121 et seq.) under the
authority of Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
(P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. § 2778) by adding Afghanistan at Section
126.1 of 22 C.F.R. Part 126.  On July 2, 2002, the State Department
amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales
to the new Afghan government.  
! In a ruling largely redundant with the one above, on May 15, 1997,
the State Department designated Afghanistan under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
132), as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism
efforts.  The designation, made primarily because of the Taliban’s
harboring of  bin Laden, makes Afghanistan ineligible to receive
U.S. exports of items on the U.S. Munitions List.  The designation
was repeated every year since 1997.  Afghanistan was deleted from
the list of non-cooperative states when the list was reissued on May
15, 2002, thereby eliminating this sanction on Afghanistan.
! On July 4, 1999, the President declared a national emergency with
respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden, and issued
Executive Order 13129 that imposed sanctions.  The sanctions
include the blocking of Taliban assets and property in the United
States, and a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of
Afghanistan.  On August 10, 1999, the Administration determined
that Ariana Afghan Airlines was a Taliban entity.  That
determination triggered a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline.
On January 29, 2002, the State Department issued a determination
that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan, thus
essentially ending this trade ban.  On July 2, 2002, President Bush
formally revoked this executive order.
! On October 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
1267; on December 19, 2000, it adopted U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1333, imposed a number of new sanctions against the
Taliban.  For the provisions of these sanctions, see the section on the
harboring of bin Laden.  As noted, these sanctions were narrowed to
penalize only Al Qaeda by virtue of the adoption of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002. 
CRS-48
Table 1.  U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002(Final)
U.S. Department of
Agriculture (DOA)

















































































































Totals $76.6 $113.2 $182.6 $815.9
CRS-49
Table 2.  U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003
(in millions, same acronyms as above table)











Total from this law: $372
From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
ESF $167
($100 million for Kabul-Qandahar road;
$plus 10 million for provincial
reconstruction teams; and $57 million for
operational support to Afghan
government)
Military Aid $170 
(to train Afghan national army)
Anti-terrorism/de-mining $28
Total from this law: $365 
Total for FY2003: $737
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Table 3.  U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
(in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)









Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) $58









Total from this law: $1,320





(earmarks: $2 million for reforestation;
$2 million for the Afghan Judicial
Reform Commission; $5 million for
Afghan women; and $2 million for aid to
communities and victims of U.S. military
operations)
Military Assistance $50
Total from this law: $403
Total for FY2004 $1,723
CRS-51
Table 4.  U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005
(In millions)
From the FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447
ESF to assist Afghan governing
institutions
$225 
FMF to train and equip the ANA $400
Assistance to benefit women and girls $50
Agriculture, private sector investment,
environment, primary education,




Child and maternal health $6
Afghan Independent Human Rights
Commission 
$2
Total from this law $985
From First FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 108-287)
FMF for training and equipping the ANA
(and the Iraqi security forces) 
$500
From Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
DoD funds to train and equip Afghan
security forces  
$1,285
DoD counter-narcotics operations $242
ESF for reconstruction and democracy




INL Afghan police training $360
Karzi protection (NADR funds) $17.1
Commanders’ Emergency Response
Program (CERP), mostly for counter-
narcotics 
$34
DEA operations in Afghanistan $7.7
Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul $60
Total from this law $3,351
Total from all FY2005 laws $4,336 (plus ANA portion of $500 
million for ANA and Iraqi forces)
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1978 4.989  — 5.742 0.269 0.789 11.789
1979 3.074  — 7.195  — 0.347 10.616
1980  — (Soviet invasion - December 1979)  —  — 
1981  —  —  —  —  —  — 
1982  —  —  —  —  —  — 
1983  —  —  —  —  —  — 
1984  —  —  —  —  —  — 
1985 3.369  —  —  —  — 3.369
1986  —  — 8.9  —  — 8.9
1987 17.8 12.1 2.6  —  — 32.5
1988 22.5 22.5 29.9  —  — 74.9
1989 22.5 22.5 32.6  —  — 77.6
1990 35.0 35.0 18.1  —  — 88.1
1991 30.0 30.0 20.1  —  — 80.1
1992 25.0 25.0 31.4  —  — 81.4
1993 10.0 10.0 18.0  — 30.2 68.2
1994 3.4 2.0 9.0  — 27.9 42.3
1995 1.8  — 12.4  — 31.6 45.8
1996  —  — 16.1  — 26.4 42.5
1997  —  — 18.0  — 31.9* 49.9
1998  —  — 3.6  — 49.14** 52.74
Source: U.S. Department of State.
* Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
** Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and
$1.54 for counternarcotics.
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Table 6.  ISAF Contributing Nations
(As of May  2005)
NATO website: [http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm]
NATO Countries Non-NATO Partner Nations
Belgium 600 Albania 22
Bulgaria 35 Austria 3
Canada 1,250 Azerbaijan 22
Czech Republic 17 Croatia 47
Denmark 55 Finland 82
Estonia 9 Macedonia 20
France 800 Georgia 50
Germany 1,000 Ireland 10
Greece 151 Sweden 85
Hungary 140 Switzerland 4

















Table 7.  Major Factions in Afghanistan
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Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan
